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Lemons, Legislatures, and Liberties: The Constitutionality
of Prayer at Public School Board Meetings
I. Introduction
While the Establishment Clause protects the people from the
commingling of church and state, 1 the Supreme Court has consistently
allowed legislatures to begin sessions with an opening prayer. 2 Generally,
according to the bodies that practice legislative prayer, the purpose of the
ritual is to “place [officials] in a solemn and deliberative frame of mind” 3
and “create a ‘more businesslike and professional decorum.’”4 In allowing
such practices, the Court did not engage in its typical analysis of
Establishment Clause claims. Instead, the Court emphasized the historical
tradition of prayer beginning such sessions and evidence that the founders
would have accepted such practices. 5 The Court’s historical interpretation,
however, has been criticized as not completely accurate.6
The Sixth Circuit first considered the issue of opening prayers at public
school board meetings in 1999.7 Holding opening prayers at public school
board meetings unconstitutional, 8 the Sixth Circuit created a precedent that
the Third Circuit and the Ninth Circuit upheld, respectively, in 2011 and
2018.9 The Fifth Circuit, however, departed from this precedent and
allowed opening prayers at public school board meetings in 2017.10
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the Fifth Circuit case, 11
the right to freedom of religion is a relentless government bulwark
deserving of preservation. When children are involved in Establishment
Clause claims, the Court has, rightfully, been concerned about the potential
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983); see also Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 592 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring).
3. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 570 (majority opinion).
4. Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1999).
5. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792; see also Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576.
6. See, e.g., Chad West, Note, Legislative Prayer: Historical Tradition and
Contemporary Issues, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 709, 711–14.
7. Coles, 171 F.3d at 371.
8. Id. at 385–86.
9. Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
565 U.S. 1157 (2012); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2018).
10. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 529–30 (5th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 470 (2018).
11. Id.
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coercive nature of prayer in the school setting due to children’s
susceptibility towards conformity. 12 The public school board plays a
significant role in shaping schools’ policies, procedures, and even
disciplinary actions. Additionally, the school board embodies a public
nature, rather than a legislative nature, in which the Supreme Court has
allowed opening prayer. Because public school board meetings greatly
influence schools’ policies, atmosphere, and social structure, opening
prayers at such meetings are unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause.
This Comment discusses the constitutionality, under the Establishment
Clause and Supreme Court precedent, of opening prayer at public school
board meetings. Part II analyzes the tests that courts utilize to determine if a
law or practice violates the Establishment Clause, including the Supreme
Court’s standard rejection of religion and prayer in the public school
setting. 13 Part III analyzes the recent circuit split regarding opening prayer
in public school board meetings. 14 Part IV of this Comment recommends a
constitutional approach for future courts confronted with prayer in the
public school board setting and similar situations. 15 Public school boards
should begin sessions with a moment of silence, allowing each individual to
use that time as he or she so chooses. Finally, Part V concludes by
emphasizing the role of the Establishment Clause in promoting democratic
engagement. 16
II. Establishment Clause ‘Tests’
The Establishment Clause protects the people against “three main
evils”17 regarding religion and government: “sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”18 When
confronted with an Establishment Clause claim, the Supreme Court has
applied numerous—and often paradoxical—tests.

12. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (“Research in psychology
supports the common assumption that adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from
their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in matters of social
convention.”).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
18. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/5

2021]

COMMENT

741

A. Traditional Analysis: The Lemon Test
In 1971, the Supreme Court articulated a three-pronged approach to
determine whether a challenged law or practice violates the Establishment
Clause.19 Moving forward, the Supreme Court itself utilized this analysis in
Establishment Clause claims.20 The three prongs require the statute to “have
a secular legislative purpose,” have a “principal or primary effect . . . that
neither advances nor inhibits religions,” and avoid “foster[ing] ‘an
excessive government entanglement with religion.’” 21 If the statute violates
one prong, the law is unconstitutional.22
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court considered two similar state statutes
that provided aid to nonpublic schools. 23 While explicitly prohibiting the
use of state-provided funds for religious purposes, the statutes primarily
funded Roman Catholic schools. 24 Additionally, both statutes allowed stateprovided funds to supplement nonpublic schoolteachers’ salaries. 25
The Court found excessive entanglement, violating the third prong, due
to the “cumulative impact of the entire relationship . . . between
government and religion.”26 Specifically, the Court was concerned with
states funding nonpublic school teachers’ salaries because even “[w]ith the
best of intentions such a teacher would find it hard to make a total
separation between secular teaching and religious doctrine.” 27 Moreover,
one statute enabled the state to perform a post-audit of the nonpublic
school’s financial records to ensure that only secular programs were state
funded, which the Court found “creates an intimate and continuing
relationship between church and state.”28
While the majority opinion did not allude to any heightened concern of
Establishment Clause claims in relation to children, Justice Douglas, in his
concurring opinion, highlighted it as a key issue. 29 Justice Douglas noted
that a primary disadvantage of the public school system “is that a state
system may attempt to mold all students alike according to the views of the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.
See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (citations omitted).
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40–41 (1980).
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606.
Id. at 608–10.
Id. at 607, 609.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 618–19.
Id. at 621–22.
Id. at 630 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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dominant group and to discourage the emergence of individual
idiosyncrasies.”30
B. The ‘Legislative Prayer Exception:’ The Marsh-Greece Test
After articulating the Lemon three-pronged analysis, the Supreme Court
consistently applied the analysis to a multitude of Establishment Clause
claims.31 In applying the analysis in various cases, the Court held various
challenged practices as violating the Establishment Clause,32 and the Court
also held other practices as constitutional. 33 In practice, the Lemon test
requires a case-by-case analysis. When presented with a claim challenging
a legislative-prayer practice, the Eighth Circuit applied the Lemon
analysis.34 On review of the Eighth Circuit’s decision, however, the
Supreme Court created a different analysis altogether for legislative-prayer
claims just twelve years after its articulation of the Lemon analysis.35
1. Marsh v. Chambers
In 1983, the Supreme Court considered whether a state legislature’s
practice of beginning sessions with an opening prayer violates the
Establishment Clause.36 While the Eighth Circuit applied the Lemon test
and found the practice violated all three prongs, 37 the Supreme Court
reversed and, significantly, did not apply the Lemon analysis.38
Instead, the Court’s analysis focused on “the unambiguous and unbroken
history” of beginning legislative sessions with prayer.39 “The opening of
sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer,” the
majority argued, “is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this
country.”40 Specifically, the Court noted that both the Continental Congress
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (applying the Lemon
analysis after Marsh); New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977) (applying the
Lemon analysis prior to Marsh).
32. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779–
80 (1973); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123, 126 (1982).
33. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 736 (1973); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388, 404 (1983).
34. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234–35 (8th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 463 U.S. 783
(1983).
35. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786–91 (1983).
36. Id. at 784.
37. Chambers, 675 F.2d at 234–35.
38. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786–91.
39. Id. at 792.
40. Id. at 786.
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and the First Congress engaged in such practices. 41 The Constitutional
Convention, however, did not begin with a prayer, though Chief Justice
Burger averred that “this may simply have been an oversight.”42
Based on these historical instances of legislative prayer, the Court
concluded that “[c]learly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion
Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a
violation of that Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with
prayer has continued without interruption ever since that early session of
Congress.”43 The Court focused on this historical evidence regarding the
founders’ practices because it “sheds light not only on what the draftsmen
intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought
that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress—their
actions reveal their intent.”44 Additionally, the Court interpreted evidence of
the founders’ debates regarding the constitutionality of legislative prayer as
“demonstrating that the subject was considered carefully and the action not
taken thoughtlessly, by force of long tradition and without regard to the
problems posed by a pluralistic society.” 45
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than
200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening
legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of
our society. To invoke Divine guidance on a public body
entrusted with making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an
“establishment” of religion or a step toward establishment; it is
simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held
among the people of this country.46
Therefore, the Court held that the state legislature may continue its practice
of beginning sessions with an opening prayer because it is not an
“establishment” of religion, given the historical tradition of legislative
prayer.47
In an impassioned dissent, Justice William J. Brennan criticized the
majority for “carving out an exception to the Establishment Clause” instead

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 787–88.
Id. at 787 n.6.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 790.
Id. at 791.
Id. at 792.
Id.
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of adhering to established precedent, namely the Lemon test.48 Justice
Brennan had “no doubt that, if any group of law students were asked to
apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they
would nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional.” 49
Justice Brennan found the majority’s reasoning unpersuasive for three
key reasons.50 First, it was “self-evident” to Justice Brennan “[t]hat the
‘purpose’ of legislative prayer is pre-eminently religious rather than
secular.”51 Any secular purpose that such a practice might afford, like
“formally opening the legislative session, getting the members of the body
to quiet down, and imbuing them with a sense of seriousness and high
purpose,” could be accomplished without any connection to prayer or
religion.52 Second, “[t]he ‘primary effect’ of legislative prayer is also
clearly religious” because it “explicitly link[s] religious belief and
observance to the power and prestige of the State.” 53 Third, legislative
prayer necessarily entails “excessive entanglement” between government
and religion.54 Specifically, the method of selecting a “‘suitable’ chaplain”
entangles government and religion.55
Justice Brennan also discussed the implicit principles of “separation
[and] neutrality” in the Establishment Clause. 56 One purpose of these
principles is “to guarantee the individual right to conscience,”57 which is
“implicated when the government engages in direct or indirect coercion” 58
and “when the government requires individuals to support the practices of a
faith with which they do not agree.” 59 Second, the First Amendment’s
adherence to separation and neutrality ensures that the state does not
“interfer[e] in the essential autonomy of religious life.” 60 Additionally,
these principals “prevent the trivialization and degradation of religion by
too close an attachment to the organs of government.”61 Finally, separation
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 800–01.
Id. at 796–801.
Id. at 797.
Id. at 797–98.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id. at 799.
Id. at 803.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 804.
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and neutrality ensure that religious debates do not infiltrate the political
sphere so citizens do not “feel alienated from [their] government because
that government has declared or acted upon some ‘official’ or ‘authorized’
point of view on a matter of religion.”62
Moreover, the dissent rebutted the majority’s interpretation of the
“unbroken practice” of legislative prayer in the United States. 63 Justice
Brennan noted that the founders did not include a reference to “God” in the
Constitution, which significantly differed from the Articles of
Confederation and many state constitutions following the revolution. 64
Additionally, the dissent referenced James Madison questioning the early
Congresses’ beginning sessions with an opening prayer: “Is the
appointment of Chaplains to the two Houses of Congress consistent with
the Constitution, and with the pure principle of religious freedom?” 65 The
dissent continued by criticizing the belief that the founders should be
viewed as “sacred figures whose every actions must be emulated,” rather
than “the authors of a document meant to last for the ages.” 66
Justice Brennan recognized “that not every governmental act which
coincides with or conflicts with a particular religious belief is for that
reason an establishment of religion.”67 Yet, that reasoning does not justify
legislative prayer because “prayer is fundamentally and necessarily
religious.”68 Therefore, the dissent urged the abolishment of legislative
prayer so that “all the purposes of the Establishment Clause” are
“vindicate[d].”69
2. Town of Greece v. Galloway
In 2014, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Marsh and expanded it to allow
legislative prayer in town board meetings. 70 Since 1999, the town board
began its public meetings with an opening prayer delivered by a local
clergyman, 71 who “compose[d] their own devotions” without approval or
guidance by the board.72 Similar to the majority’s reasoning in Marsh, the
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 805–06.
Id. at 806–08.
Id. at 807.
Id.
Id. at 817.
Id. at 810.
Id.
Id. at 812.
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 570 (2014).
Id.
Id. at 571.
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town argued that the opening prayer served several nonreligious functions,
including creating a solemn environment and honoring tradition, and
“follow[ed] a tradition practiced by Congress.”73
In analyzing the town board’s practice, the Court cautioned against
interpreting Marsh “as permitting a practice that would amount to a
constitutional violation if not for its historical foundation.” 74 Instead, Marsh
demonstrates “that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by
reference to historical practices and understandings.’” 75 The proper inquiry
in legislative-prayer claims is “to determine whether the [challenged]
prayer practice . . . fits within the tradition long followed in Congress and
the state legislatures.”76
The Court emphasized that “Marsh nowhere suggested that the
constitutionality of legislative prayer turns on the neutrality of its
content.”77 Therefore, the Court rejected the argument that legislative
prayer must be nonsectarian because such a requirement “would force the
legislatures that sponsor prayers and the courts that are asked to decide
these cases to act as supervisors and censors of religious speech.”78 Any
restraints on legislative prayer come instead from “its place at the opening
of legislative sessions, where it is meant to lend gravity on the occasion and
reflect values long part of the Nation’s heritage.” 79
The Court noted that the “principal audience” of the legislative prayer
challenged in Town of Greece was not the public but the town board
members.80 Unconstitutional coercion does not occur in legislative bodies
simply because the body “expos[es] constituents to prayer they would
rather not hear and in which they need not participate.” 81 The Court
explained, however, that “[t]he analysis would be different if town board
members directed the public to participate in the prayers, singled out
dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that their decisions might be
influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.” 82 Yet, the
73. Id. at 570.
74. Id. at 576.
75. Id. (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 577.
77. Id. at 580.
78. Id. at 581.
79. Id. at 582–83.
80. Id. at 587 (“The principal audience for these invocations is not, indeed, the public
but lawmakers themselves, who may find that a moment of prayer of quiet reflection sets the
mind to a higher purpose and thereby eases the task of governing.”).
81. Id. at 590.
82. Id. at 588.
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Court cautioned that “[a]bsent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate,
proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose, a challenge
based solely on the content of a prayer will not likely establish a
constitutional violation.”83
The dissenting opinions in Town of Greece did not call into question the
underlying premise of Marsh—that legislative prayer is constitutional based
on its historical tradition—but, rather, objected to the specific form of
legislative prayer at the town board. 84 In her dissenting opinion, Justice
Elena Kagan argued that the town board’s practice was unconstitutional
because the “meetings involve participating by ordinary citizens, and the
invocations given—directly to those citizens—were predominately
sectarian in content”85 and because the town board “did nothing to
recognize religious diversity.”86
According to Justice Kagan, when governments offer primarily sectarian
prayers that reference a single religion, the “public proceeding becomes
(whether intentionally or not) an instrument for dividing [a minority citizen]
from adherents to the community’s majority religion, and for altering the
very nature of her relationship with her government.”87 The U.S.
Constitution guarantees that a citizen’s “religious beliefs” do not affect
one’s ability “to perform a service or request a benefit” from the
government.88 Therefore, exclusively sectarian prayers that refer
exclusively to the majority religion have no place in governmental
proceedings because they can alienate minority citizens.89
Additionally, Justice Kagan rebutted the majority’s assertion that
requiring legislative prayers to be nonsectarian would necessitate
government sponsorship of religion.90 “If the Town Board had let its
chaplains know that they should speak in nonsectarian terms, common to
diverse religious groups, then no one would have valid grounds for
complaint.”91 Alternatively, the town board could have “invited clergy of
83. Id. at 585.
84. See id. at 610 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the Second Circuit “did not
believe that the Constitution forbids legislative prayers that incorporate content associated
with a particular denomination”); id. at 616 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the Court’s
decision in Marsh v. Chambers.” (citation omitted)).
85. Id. at 616 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 621.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 632.
91. Id.
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many faiths to serve as chaplains, as the majority notes that Congress
does.”92
In conclusion, the Town of Greece Court reaffirmed the holding of
Marsh and extended its application to town board meetings. 93 Lower courts
are instructed to consider whether the challenged practice conforms with
the historical tradition of prayer at such public bodies. 94
3. Lower Courts’ Applications of the Marsh-Greece Test
Following the Supreme Court’s clarification of Marsh in Town of
Greece, claims regarding prayer practices in meetings of counties’ boards
of commissioners reached the Fourth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit. 95
Interestingly, while the two circuits agreed that the Marsh-Greece
framework was the correct analysis for such issues, 96 their holdings
diverged. 97
a) Lund v. Rowan County
The Fourth Circuit found that the challenged practice violated the
Establishment Clause under the Marsh-Greece analysis. 98 In Lund, the
board of commissioners began their bi-monthly meetings with an opening
prayer.99 “No one outside the Board is permitted to offer [such] an
invocation.”100 Moreover, the prayers, both “composed and delivered” by a
commissioner,101 were “invariably and unmistakably Christian in
content.”102
When presented with “whether Rowan County’s practice of lawmakerled sectarian prayer runs afoul of the Establishment Clause,” 103 the Fourth
Circuit applied the Marsh-Greece framework and emphasized the Supreme
92. Id.
93. Id. at 570 (majority opinion).
94. Id. at 577.
95. See Lund v. Rowan Cnty., 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Bormuth v. Cnty.
of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017).
96. Lund, 863 F.3d at 276; Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509.
97. Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 290 (holding that the practice violated the
Establishment Clause under the Marsh-Greece analysis), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 514–15
(holding that the practice did not violate the Establishment Clause under the Marsh-Greece
analysis).
98. Lund, 863 F.3d at 290.
99. Id. at 272.
100. Id. at 273.
101. Id. at 272.
102. Id. at 273.
103. Id. at 271–72.
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Court’s iteration of the purposes of legislative prayer. 104 The Fourth Circuit
recognized that the Supreme Court “acknowledged that it has not ‘define[d]
the precise boundary of the Establishment Clause.’” 105 Additionally, the
Fourth Circuit noted that neither Marsh nor Town of Greece involved
lawmaker-led prayer.106
In applying the Marsh-Greece analysis, the Fourth Circuit considered
the board’s prayer practice “from the perspective of the ‘reasonable
observer,’ who is presumed to be ‘acquainted with [the] tradition’ of
legislative prayer.”107 Due to the unique circumstances of this legislator-led
prayer,108 which consisted nearly exclusively of Christian doctrine 109 and
often “served to advance that faith,” 110 the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause under the Marsh-Greece
framework.111 The prayer practice was “exploited to proselytize or advance
[a particular faith] or to disparage any other.”112
The Fourth Circuit contrasted the present facts from those in Marsh and
Town of Greece. The Fourth Circuit distinguished the identity of the prayergivers—in Marsh and Town of Greece, the state invited the prayer-giver;
“[b]ut in Rowan County, the prayer-giver was the state itself.” 113
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit noted that the ability to lead prayer in this
case “was exclusively reserved for the commissioners,” while the prayer
opportunity in Marsh and Town of Greece reserved the prayer opportunity
for guests.114
In considering the legislator-led prayer, the Fourth Circuit was careful to
emphasize that it “is not inherently unconstitutional.” 115 Weighing the
104. Id. at 275–76 (“[A] moment of prayer or quiet reflection sets the mind[s] [of
legislators] to a higher purpose and thereby eases the task of governing.” (alterations in
original) (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 587 (2014)).
105. Id. at 276 (alteration in original) (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 283–84 (alteration in original) (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587).
108. Id. at 277.
109. Id. at 273 (“97% of the Board’s prayers mentioned ‘Jesus,’ ‘Christ,’ or the
‘Savior.’”).
110. Id. at 284–85 (“By portraying the failure to love Jesus or follow his teachings as
spiritual defects, the prayers implicitly ‘signal[ed] the disfavor toward’ non-Christians.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 589)).
111. Id. at 275.
112. Id. at 276 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983)) (alterations in
original).
113. Id. at 281.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 280.
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empirical evidence regarding legislator-led prayer, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that “while lawmakers may occasionally lead an invocation, this
phenomenon appears to be the exception to the rule, at least at the state and
federal levels.”116 In reaching its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit considered
“the identity of the prayer-giver [as] relevant to the constitutional
inquiry.”117
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the real “risk of political
division stemming from prayer practice conflict.” 118 For example, after an
individual who objected to the board’s prayer practice was “booed and
jeered by the audience,”119 the prayer practice became a campaign issue in
the subsequent board elections.120 These threats to democracy, according to
both the Supreme Court in Lemon and the Fourth Circuit, are perils that
“the First Amendment was intended to protect” against. 121
b) Bormuth v. County of Jackson
Following the Town of Greece decision, the Sixth Circuit was confronted
with a claim regarding opening prayer in monthly public meetings of a
county board of commissioners.122 In Bormuth, the Sixth Circuit applied the
Marsh-Greece framework in its analysis of the board’s practice. 123 While
recognizing that its holding “conflict[s] with the Fourth Circuit’s recent en
banc decision,” the Sixth Circuit ultimately found the Fourth Circuit’s
opinion and reasoning “unpersuasive.” 124
The Sixth Circuit applied Marsh-Greece by “follow[ing] the Supreme
Court’s precedent and conclud[ing] Lemon’s endorsement test is
inapplicable to legislative prayer cases.”125 Previously, the Sixth Circuit
refused to apply the Marsh-Greece framework to a public school board’s
practice of beginning meetings with an opening prayer.126 In Bormuth,

116. Id. at 279.
117. Id. at 280.
118. Id. at 282.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971)).
122. Bormuth v. Cnty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2017).
123. Id. at 509 (“[T]he prayer practice [in Jackson Country] fits within the tradition long
followed in Congress and the state legislatures.” (alteration in original) (quoting Town of
Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014)).
124. Id. at 509 n.5.
125. Id. at 515.
126. Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 381 (6th Cir. 1999).
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however, the Sixth Circuit declined to reconsider prayer in public school
board meetings “[b]ecause the issue is not [now] before us.”127
In Bormuth, the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that the board’s
“prayer practice falls outside our historically accepted traditions because
the Commissioners themselves, not chaplains, or invited community
members, lead the invocations.” 128 In so holding, the Sixth Circuit
emphasized that the Supreme Court never restricted “who may give
prayers” in either Marsh or Town of Greece. 129 Additionally, the court’s
analysis relied on the “long-standing tradition” of legislator-led prayer,
which amicus briefs of various states sought to establish. 130 “Amici’s
helpful identification of the historical breadth of legislator-led prayer in the
state capitals for over one hundred fifty years more than confirms to us that
our history embraces prayers by legislators as part of the ‘benign
acknowledgement of religion’s role in society.’” 131
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit considered the strange results that could
occur if a constitutional distinction was made regarding who led prayer: “an
invocation delivered in one county by a guest minister would be upheld,
while the identical invocation delivered in another county by one of the
legislators would be struck down.” 132 The Sixth Circuit also rejected the
argument that the board’s practice violated the Establishment Clause
because “the prayers offered before the Board generally espouse the
Christian faith.”133 Again relying on Marsh and Town of Greece, the court
held “that creed-specific prayers alone do not violate the First
Amendment.”134
C. Justice O’Connor’s Endorsement Test
Another test was articulated in the 1980s by Justice O’Connor in a
concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.135 The endorsement test

127. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 505 n.4.
128. Id. at 509.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 509–10.
131. Id. at 510 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014)).
132. Id. at 512.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 513 (stating that the Supreme Court, in Town of Greece, clarified that Marsh
“did not ‘imply the rule that prayer violates the Establishment Clause any time it is given in
the name of a figure deified by only one faith or creed’” (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S.
at 580–81)).
135. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–89 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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“clarifies” the excessive entanglement prong.136 Justice O’Connor began
her opinion by recognizing that “[t]he Establishment Clause prohibits
government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a
person’s standing in the political community.” 137
While acknowledging excessive entanglement as a way governments can
violate the Establishment Clause, Justice O’Connor was primarily
concerned with “government endorsement or disapproval of religion.” 138
Endorsement, according to Justice O’Conner, is a “more direct
infringement” than entanglement because it “sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not fully members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends
the opposite message.”139
Rejecting the argument that political divisiveness caused by government
action violates the Lemon excessive entanglement prong,140 Justice
O’Connor clarified that “[t]he entanglement prong of the Lemon test is
properly limited to institutional entanglement.” 141 While the existence of
political divisiveness “may be evidence” of an Establishment Clause
violation, “the constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the
character of the government activity that might cause such divisiveness, not
on the divisiveness itself.”142
D. Prayer in the Public School Setting
The Supreme Court is hesitant to allow religious practices in the public
school setting.143 Generally, the Court forbids government sponsorship of
religion in public schools due to children’s impressionable nature,
children’s susceptibility to peer pressure, and the mandatory attendance
requirement. 144 The Court has also characterized prayer in public schools as
an “indirect coercion” risk. 145 The Justices are generally more hesitant
136. Id.
137. Id. at 687 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 687–88.
139. Id. at 688.
140. Id. at 689 (“In my view, political divisiveness along religious lines should not be an
independent test of constitutionality.”).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding unconstitutional a
public school’s practice of beginning each day with a prayer).
144. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987).
145. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/5

2021]

COMMENT

753

about indirect coercion because students are more susceptible to such
risks.146
1. Prayer at the Beginning of Public School Days
In 1962, the Supreme Court considered whether a school district’s
practice of beginning each day with an opening prayer violates the
Establishment Clause. 147 The prayer, which state officials wrote, read,
“Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg
Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our Country.” 148 The
Court held the practice as “wholly inconsistent with the Establishment
Clause” because the same “establish[es] an official religion,” regardless of
whether it “directly . . . coerce[d] nonobserving individuals or not.” 149
Additionally, the Court maintained that “[i]t is neither sacrilegious nor
antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should
stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave
that purely religious function to the people.”150 Holding that an opening
prayer to begin the public school day violates the Establishment Clause, the
Court would continue to strike down similar practices, 151 like prayer at
public school graduations.152
2. Prayer at Public School Graduations
In 1992, the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman held a school district’s
practice of including prayer in middle school and high school graduations
unconstitutional as violating the Establishment Clause. 153 The Court
focused on the coercive atmosphere of school compared to the atmosphere
of a legislative session.154
The atmosphere at the opening session of a state legislature
where adults are free to enter and leave with little comment and
for any number of reasons cannot compare with the constraining
146. Id. (“As we have observed before, there are heightened concerns with protecting
freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public
schools.”).
147. Engel, 370 U.S. at 423.
148. Id. at 422.
149. Id. at 424, 430.
150. Id. at 435.
151. Id. at 424.
152. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 596–97.
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potential of the one school event most important for the student
to attend. The influence and force of a formal exercise in a
school graduation are far greater than the prayer exercise we
condoned in Marsh.155
The Court was concerned with protecting students from “subtle coercive
pressure” in public schools.156 Additionally, the Court referred to
psychology studies which maintain that children generally are vulnerable to
peer pressure, and such is “strongest in matters of social convention.” 157
Moreover, the Court highlighted the extreme political divisiveness of
undisguised religious exercises in public school, where students have “no
real alternative . . . to avoid the fact or appearance of participation.” 158
Finally, the Court recognized that the founding fathers believed that the
governmental establishment of religion was “antithetical to the freedom of
all.”159
Lee articulates that the Court is hesitant to allow any form of religion,
including prayers, in the public school setting. Due to the reality of peer
pressure in adolescents, the coercive nature of the school setting, and the
Constitution’s protection of individuals’ freedom of religion, the Court has
consistently declared unconstitutional the use of prayer in public schools.
3. Prayer at Public School Extracurricular Activities
In 2000, the Supreme Court considered whether its disapproval of prayer
in public schools extended to voluntary school-sponsored events,
specifically student-led and student-initiated prayers before high school
football games. 160 The stated purpose of the prayer was to “solemnize” the
sporting events.161
Considering the prayer practice at the football games, the Court’s
analysis was “guided by the principles that we endorsed in Lee.”162 In
holding that “an objective Santa Fe High School student will
unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her
school’s seal of approval,” the Court applied Justice O’Connor’s so-called

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 597.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 591.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
Id. at 296–97, 298 n.6.
Id. at 302.
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endorsement test.163 “In cases involving state participation in a religious
activity, one of the relevant questions is ‘whether an objective observer,
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the
statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public
schools.’”164
While the school district argued that attendance at the events was
voluntary, the Court noted that attendance was essentially mandatory for
many students, such as the players, the cheerleaders, and the band
members.165 More strikingly, however, the Court explained that it would
still find the pregame prayer to be coercive even assuming all students’
attendance to be completely voluntary.166 “Even if we regard every high
school student’s decision to attend a home football game as purely
voluntary, we are nevertheless persuaded that the delivery of a pregame
prayer has the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an
act of religious worship.”167
Regarding the school district’s election system for choosing the student
who would lead the prayer, the Court was concerned “that minority
candidates will never prevail and that their views will be effectively
silenced.”168 Concerning the school district’s entanglement with religion,
the Court again referenced Lee: “In this case, as we found in Lee, the
‘degree of school involvement’ makes it clear that the pregame players bear
‘the imprint of the State and thus put school-age children who objected in
an untenable position.’”169 Specifically, the Court was concerned with the
school district’s policy behind the prayer “to solemnize the event,” which,
“by its terms, invites and encourages religious messages.” 170 Additionally,
the Court was cognizant of the environment in which these prayers were
presented: “Once the student speaker is selected and the message
composed, the invocation is then delivered to a large audience assembled as
part of a regularly scheduled, school-sponsored function conducted on
school property.”171

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 308.
Id. (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
Id. at 292.
Id. at 312.
Id.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 305 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)).
Id. at 306.
Id. at 307.
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The Court, although ultimately striking down this practice as
unconstitutional, articulated a reoccurring tension in Establishment Clause
cases between “the sincere desire to include public prayer as a part of
various occasions so as to mark those occasions’ significance” and the First
Amendment’s guarantee of separation of church and state. 172
III. Prayer in Public School Board Meetings
Recently, the specific issue of opening prayer in public school board
meetings has circulated the lower courts. The majority of courts addressing
the issue have applied the Lemon analysis and concluded such practices are
unconstitutional. 173 In 2017, however, the Fifth Circuit analogized school
boards to legislatures and instead applied the Marsh-Greece framework,
finding the practice of opening prayers constitutional. 174
A. The Majority View
In applying the Lemon test to public school boards’ prayer practices, the
majority of circuits focused on the inherent differences between a public
school board and a legislative session. 175 The circuits articulated a
reoccurring difference between the two: students were generally present at
the board meetings, both voluntarily and involuntarily. 176 These circuits
emphasized the school boards are “an integral component” of the public
school system. 177
1. Sixth Circuit: Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Board of Education
In Cleveland, Ohio, the public school board is responsible for a variety
of school policies, including “the school system’s curriculum, dress code,
searches of student lockers, disciplinary rules, expulsion and suspension
procedures, and the promotion of ‘ethical principles and democratic ideals’

172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 383, 385 (6th
Cir. 1999); Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 283, 290 (3d Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 565 U.S. 1157 (2012); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2018).
174. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 526, 529–30 (5th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 470 (2018).
175. See, e.g., Coles, 171 F.3d at 382–83.
176. Id. at 381–82; see also Indian River, 653 F.3d at 281; Chino Valley, 896 F.3d at
1145–46.
177. Coles, 171 F.3d at 381.
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in students.”178 Approximately twice per month, the school board holds
meetings on school property that are opened to the public, including both
adults and students, who can discuss issues and concerns with the board. 179
Additionally, “a student representative regularly sits on the school board
itself,” and the board regularly invites students of all ages in recognition of
the students’ various achievements. 180
Although the school board held meetings without prayer prior to 1992, 181
the newly elected board president established the practice of beginning the
meetings with an opening prayer to promote a “more businesslike and
professional decorum.”182 That same year, a high school student was invited
to a board meeting to receive an award. 183 The high school student was
“shocked and surprised” by the opening prayer and “questioned whether
she would attend another school board meeting if the practice continued.” 184
Additionally, a high school teacher consistently questioned the
constitutionality of the board’s practice of opening prayer, but he continued
attending the meetings so to address various issues with the board. 185 Since
he had to arrive early to secure a seat, the teacher could not wait outside of
the meeting until the conclusion of the prayer in order to join afterward. 186
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by acknowledging that “the Supreme
Court has consistently held that school-sponsored religious activity
transgresses the Establishment Clause.”187 The Sixth Circuit then
acknowledged the Marsh decision, which, at the time, was “the only case in
which the Court has dealt with government-sponsored prayer outside the
context of the public schools.”188 The court framed the issue as “whether
the school board’s practice falls within the mainstream of school prayer
cases, as did the graduation speaker in Lee, or instead is controlled by
Marsh, a historical exception to the mainstream.” 189 In determining which
analysis to apply to public school board meetings, the Sixth Circuit noted
178. Id. at 372 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.602 (West, Westlaw through 133d
Gen. Assemb.)).
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 373.
183. Id. at 374.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 376.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 377.
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that “the school board is an integral part of the public school system.” 190
The Sixth Circuit interpreted a “dual basis” underlying the Supreme Court’s
decisions regarding public schools and religion: “One is the fact that
students are young, impressionable, and compelled to attend public school,
and the other is that public schools are particularly important to the
maintenance of a democratic, pluralistic society.” 191
Significantly, the Sixth Circuit refused to adopt the district court’s
reliance on a particular phrase in Marsh—“other deliberative public
bodies”—as reason to apply the Marsh analysis to additional scenarios
other than legislative bodies.192 The Sixth Circuit relied on the fact that
“[t]he Supreme Court did not define the term, and has never discussed its
scope.”193 Instead of applying the Marsh framework to the board, the Sixth
Circuit held “that the school board, unlike other public bodies, is an integral
part of the public school system.”194
In applying the traditional analysis of prayer in public schools, the Sixth
Circuit was concerned with the fact that the board meetings were held on
school property and were “attended by students who actively and regularly
participate in the discussions of school-related matters.”195 Because of the
board’s unique relationship to the school itself, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that public school boards are different than legislative bodies. 196
Under the Lemon analysis, the court held the board’s practice of
beginning meetings with an opening prayer as unconstitutional. 197 While
the board’s stated purpose of the prayers was to furnish the meetings with
“a more professional decorum,”198 the board president publicly endorsed
Christianity in his explanation of the prayer’s purpose. 199 The court
regarded these conflicting purposes as particularly concerning under the

190. Id. at 376.
191. Id. at 377.
192. Id. at 380–81.
193. Id. at 381.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. (“[T]he fact that the function of the school board is uniquely directed toward
school-related matters gives it a different type of ‘constituency’ than those of other
legislative bodies—namely, students.”).
197. Id. at 385.
198. Id. at 384.
199. Id. (referring to the board president’s statements “that the prayers were an
acknowledgement of ‘Christians who participate in the schools’ and that ‘I feel that the
moment you kick prayer out of the school, the Lord walks out of the school’”).
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secular-purpose prong. 200 Additionally, the court was concerned with the
content of the prayers, which frequently referenced the Bible and Jesus. 201
“The board could have used the inspirational words of Abraham Lincoln or,
as in fact one speaker did, the speeches of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to
achieve the same ends. Instead, the board relied upon the intrinsically
religious practice of prayer to achieve its stated secular end.”202
Under the second prong of the Lemon analysis, which considers the
primary effect of the practice, the Sixth Circuit found that the opening
prayer practice had “the primary effect of endorsing religion.”203 Because
the prayers frequently referenced a specific religion in a setting where
schoolchildren were regularly present, the court found that “any reasonable
observer would conclude that the school board was endorsing
Christianity.”204 Regarding the third prong of entanglement, the court found
nearly identical entanglement as that in Lee.205 Over a decade later, the
Third Circuit also held a public school board’s practice of beginning
meetings with an opening prayer as a violation of the Establishment
Clause.206
2. Third Circuit: Doe v. Indian River School District
In Indian River, Delaware, the public school board is tasked with
multiple responsibilities involving the schools so that the board is involved
in “nearly all aspects of a student’s life.” 207 The board’s extensive duties
include determining the public schools’ hours, holidays, and educational
policies.208 Regarding the audience of the board meetings, “at least some
students attend nearly all of the meetings held during the school year.”209
For example, a student may attend board meetings to speak with the board
when he or she has committed a serious offense requiring disciplinary
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 385.
205. Id. (“The school board decided to include prayer in its public meetings, chose which
member from the local religious community would give those prayers, and has more recently
had the school board president himself compose and deliver prayers to those in the
audience.”).
206. Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 290 (3d Circ. 2011), cert. denied, 565
U.S. 1157 (2012).
207. Id. at 263.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 264.
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actions, and students are invited to the public comments section, where they
can discuss any matter with the board.210
Since the district was formed in 1969, the school board has begun its
monthly board meetings, held on school property, with an opening
prayer.211 The prayer practice, however, was not formalized until 2004
following a “heated community debate” surrounding the practice. 212
According to the board’s policy, the purpose of the opening prayer is “to
solemnify its proceedings.”213 The Third Circuit, however, noted that “the
record shows that the prayers recited at the meetings nearly always—and
exclusively—refer to Christian concepts.”214 The policy also states that the
“prayer is voluntary, and it is among only the adult members of the
Board.”215
The Third Circuit applied Lee to the school board’s prayer policy
because “Lee and the Supreme Court’s other school prayer cases reveal that
the need to protect students from government coercion in the form of
endorsed or sponsored religion is at the heart of the school prayer cases.” 216
The court emphasized this decision was due in part to the fact that “students
are particularly vulnerable to peer pressure in social context.”217 Critically,
the court “conclude[d] that Marsh is ill-suited to [the public school board]
context because the entire purpose and structure of the Indian River School
Board revolves around public school education.” 218
Applying Lemon, the Third Circuit found that the prayer practice violates
the second prong because its “primary effect . . . is to promote
Christianity.”219 Additionally, the court highlighted that “[p]rayer in school
and at school events has been a contentious issue in the Indian River School
District for some time.”220 Regarding the excessive entanglement prong, the
court found that the prayer practice bears multiple “hallmarks of state
involvement.”221 Specifically, the school board, “in official meetings that
are completely controlled by the state,” “composes and recites the prayer”
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 264–65.
Id. at 261, 263.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 261.
See id. at 275.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 288.
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as “a formal part of the Board’s activities.” 222 Therefore, the Third Circuit
held that the school board’s prayer practice violates the Establishment
Clause.223
3. Ninth Circuit: Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Chino
Valley Unified School District Board of Education
In Chino Valley, California, the public school board is tasked with
“district administration,” which includes approving various expenses and
disciplining students.224 Following an initial “closed” session, the school
board meeting is open to the public and is “broadcast on local television.” 225
During the open session, the school board “sets aside time for ‘student
recognition,’ to highlight the academic and extracurricular
accomplishments of students in the district.”226 Additionally, a “student
representative is . . . an active participant in the meetings.” 227
Since at least 2010, the school board “has included prayer as part of its
meetings.”228 Generally, an opening prayer is given by a clergy member at
the beginning of the open session.229 Under its prayer policy, the school
board “selects clergy for each meeting” on a “first-come, first-serve, or
other random basis.”230 Primarily, the opening prayer consisted of Christian
beliefs. 231 Moreover, the school board’s president consistently referenced
God throughout the meetings.232
Because the opening “prayers typically take place before groups of
schoolchildren whose attendance is not truly voluntary and whose
relationship to school district officials, including the Board, is not one of

222. Id.
223. Id. at 290.
224. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2018).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1138.
227. Id. at 1139.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1138.
230. Id. at 1139–40.
231. Id. at 1140.
232. Id. at 1140–41 (“At another meeting, then-Board president James Na ‘urged
everyone who does not know Jesus Christ to go and find Him.’ Na informed the assembled
audience in May 2014, ‘God appointed us to be here—whether you to be teachers, or our
staff members, or our principals, or our directors, assistant superintendents . . . .’ At another
meeting, he instructed the teachers and the assembled audience: ‘anything you desire,
depend on God.’”).
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full parity,”233 the Ninth Circuit applied the Lemon test rather than the
Marsh-Greece analysis to the prayer practice.234 The court described the
school board meetings as “extensions of the educational experience of the
district’s public schools.”235 Focusing on the audience of the board
meetings, the court found that “[t]he presence of these children is integral to
the meeting: they perform for the Board, assembled audience, and
television viewers; they receive awards; and one among their number sits
on the Board and participates in the Board’s deliberative process.” 236
Applying the Lemon analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that “the [school
board’s] prayer policy and practice lacks a secular legislative purpose.” 237
Specifically, the court found that “the prayer policy’s provision for a
solemnizing invocation does not constitute a permissible secular purpose”
due to the prevalence of Christian prayer and broad endorsement of
Christianity. 238 The court stated that “[t]here is no secular reason to limit the
solemnization to prayers or, relatedly, to have a presupposition in the policy
that the solemnizers will be religious leaders.”239 Additionally, the court
found that the prayer practice violated the second prong of the Lemon test
because “the prayers frequently advanced religion in general and
Christianity in particular.”240 Regarding the third prong, the court found that
the prayer practice fostered “excessive government entanglement with
religion” because “an invocation is not necessary to accomplish” the goal of
solemnizing the meetings.241 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the
prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause. 242
B. Minority View: The Fifth Circuit
The minority approach regarding opening prayer in public school board
meetings allows such practices under the Marsh-Greece analysis by
analogizing such meetings to those of legislatures. 243 In Birdville, Texas,
the school board is responsible for “overseeing the district’s public schools,
233. Id. at 1142.
234. Id. at 1145, 1148.
235. Id. at 1145.
236. Id. at 1146.
237. Id. at 1149.
238. Id. at 1150.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1151.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1152.
243. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 470 (2018).
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adopting budgets, collecting taxes, conducting elections, [and] issuing
bonds.”244 The school board’s monthly meetings, which are open to the
public, are held in an administrative building. 245 “Most attendees are adults,
though students frequently attend school-board meetings to receive awards
or for other reasons, such as brief performances by school bands and
choirs.”246
Following the American Humanist Association’s concern with the school
board’s policy of inviting students to lead “invocations” based on merit, the
school board amended its policy.247 In 2015, the school board referred to
the opening remarks by students as “student expressions,” provided a
disclaimer that the students’ expressions “do not reflect” the school board’s
views, and invited students, who volunteered, at random to lead the
“student expressions.”248
In its decision to apply the Marsh-Greece framework, the Fifth Circuit
“agree[d] with the district court that ‘a school board is more like a
legislature than a school classroom or event.’” 249 Specifically, the Fifth
Circuit found that “[t]he [school board] is a deliberate body, charged
with . . . tasks that are undeniably legislative.” 250 The court distinguished
Birdville’s school board from those in Coles and Indian River by
emphasizing the lack of student members or representatives. 251
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit noted that “[m]ost attendees at school-board
meetings . . . are ‘mature adults.’” 252
While acknowledging that “[s]chool-board prayer presumably does not
date back to the Constitution’s adoption,” the Fifth Circuit was ultimately
persuaded by historical evidence of opening prayer at school board
meetings “dating from the early nineteenth century.”253 Furthermore, the
court accepted the board’s argument that the prayers’ audience was the
board members themselves, rather than the public present at meetings. 254
Although holding this specific practice as constitutional under the Marsh244. Id.
245. Id. at 524.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 526.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 528.
252. Id. at 526.
253. Id. at 527.
254. Id. (“In its brief, [the school board] explains that the board members are the
invocations’ primary audience. [The opposing parties] have not shown otherwise.”).
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Greece analysis, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that “it is possible to
imagine a school-board student-expression practice that offends the
Establishment Clause.”255
IV. Suggested Approach
Even though the Supreme Court has upheld legislative prayer on two
occasions, legislatures, deliberative bodies, and public school boards alike
should not begin sessions with an opening prayer. Such practices alienate
citizens and facilitate the tyranny of the majority, thereby diminishing
democracy and public engagement.
A. Problems with the “Legislative-Prayer Exception” Under Marsh-Greece
The Supreme Court has applied the Marsh-Greece test in two settings: a
state’s legislative sessions256 and a town’s board meetings. 257 In
Establishment Clause claims, the Marsh-Greece test remains the
exceptional, rather than the typical, analysis utilized by lower courts. 258
While scholars have criticized the Marsh-Greece analysis as premised on
an incomplete interpretation of the historical tradition of legislative
prayer,259 one must seriously consider whether modern society should
primarily rely on the founders’ practices regarding religion’s presence in
government. Additionally, because the traditional purposes of theological
prayer and the purposes of legislative prayer significantly differ, 260 prayer is
not necessary to achieve the purported goals of legislative prayer.
255. Id. at 529–40.
256. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983).
257. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 569–70 (2014).
258. See West, supra note 6, at 711–13 (discussing Marsh as the exception to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, applicable during a legislative prayer); see also Coles
ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 377–81 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and referring to Marsh as a “unique tradition,”
inapplicable in the context of a school board meeting).
259. See, e.g., West, supra note 6, at 712–13.
260. Compare Mark Batterson, What Is the Purpose of Prayer?, FAITH GATEWAY (Aug.
10, 2018), https://www.faithgateway.com/what-is-the-purpose-of-prayer/#.Xe7hTpNKjfY
(stating that the purpose of theological prayer is to “glorify God”), and The Purpose of
Prayer, GRACE TO YOU (Nov. 11, 1979), https://www.gty.org/library/sermons-library/
2233/the-purpose-of-prayer (explaining that the purpose of theological prayer is “[n]umber
one, to hallow the name of God; number two, to bring in his kingdom; [and] number three,
to do his will”), with Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 570 (providing that the purpose of
legislative prayer is to “place town board members in a solemn and deliberative frame of
mind”), and Coles, 171 F.3d at 373 (describing the goal of legislative prayer as “creat[ing] a
‘more businesslike and professional decorum’ at the meetings”).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court bears the duty of protecting religious
minorities from the tyranny of the majority.261 By allowing potentially
alienating legislative-prayer practices, the Court fails to adequately
maintain this safeguard.262
1. “Historical Tradition”
Laurence Tribe, a Harvard constitutional law professor, classified the
primary religious views of the founders into three categories:
first, the evangelical view (associated primarily with Roger
Williams) that “worldly corruptions . . . might consume the
churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness were not
maintained”; second, the Jeffersonian view that the church
should be walled off from the state in order to safeguard secular
interests (public and private) “against ecclesiastical depredations
and incursions”; and, third, the Madisonian view that religious
and secular interests alike would be advanced best by diffusing
and decentralizing power so as to assure competition among
sects rather than dominance by any one. 263
Today, however, there are not three primary sects of religion in the United
States.264 Instead, the country enjoys a plurality of religion, and those
religions are not exclusively based on Christianity. 265
Scholars have criticized the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
historical practice of legislative prayer as not entirely accurate. 266 The
founders were not in unanimous agreement that government actions should
be premised with a prayer.267 While conceding that the Constitutional
261. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gideon ed., 1818).
262. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 805–06 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“[N]o American should at any point feel alienated from his government because that
government has declared or acted upon some ‘official’ or ‘authorized’ point of view on a
matter of religion.”).
263. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158–59 (2d ed. 1988)
(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
264. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (“[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than
were our forefathers. They knew differences chiefly among Protestant sects. Today the
Nation is far more heterogeneous religiously, including as it does substantial minorities not
only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those who worship according to no version of the
Bible and those who worship no God at all.”).
265. Id.
266. See, e.g., West, supra note 6, at 720–26.
267. Id. at 709–10.
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Convention did not begin with a prayer, the majority opinion in Marsh
brushes this discrepancy off as a simple “oversight” because the
Convention “thought that a mid-stream adoption of the policy would
highlight prior omissions and because ‘[t]he Convention had no funds.’” 268
The lack of documented opening prayer at the Constitutional Convention,
however, might not have been an oversight. There is record of Benjamin
Franklin insisting “that chaplain-led prayer would guide the Framers as they
fashioned a new system of government.”269
On the other hand, “[t]he [same] Congress that passed the First
Amendment also reenacted the Northwest Ordinance, which declared:
‘Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government
and happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever
be encouraged.’”270 This congressional statement suggests that the founding
generation believed religion was an indispensable element in both the
formation and the continuation of government. Additionally, as President
George Washington opined, “[o]f all the dispositions and habits which lead
to political prosperity, Religion and Morality are indispensable supports.”271
As a popular president, Washington’s statements likely represented the
general population’s beliefs regarding the relationship between religion and
government.
Early state constitutions also are not particularly helpful in determining
the founders’ intent regarding the place of religion, if any, in government.
For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 included a clause
guaranteeing its citizens the right to free exercise of religion. 272 Similarly,
in 1823, Virginia enacted a statute guaranteeing, “no man shall be
compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry
whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened, in his
body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious
opinions or belief.”273 Yet, the early Virginia legislatures typically began
268. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787 n.6 (1983) (alteration in original).
269. West, supra note 6, at 710.
270. Matthew D. Fridy, Comment, What Wall? Government Neutrality and the Cleveland
Voucher Program, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 709, 720–21 (2001) (footnote omitted).
271. George Washington, Farewell Address, 19 September 1796, NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-20-02-04400002 (last visited Apr. 20, 2021).
272. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II (“[N]o man ought or of right can be compelled to attend
any religious worship . . . against, his own free will and consent: Nor can any man, who
acknowledges the being of a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a
citizen, on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship . . . .”).
273. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
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their sessions with opening prayer.274 Additionally, the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 required a religious oath for government officials: “I
believe the Christian religion, and have a firm persuasion of its truth.”275
In short, the historical evidence regarding the founders’ beliefs about
religion’s place in government is conflicting. It is questionable whether
their intentions can be definitively determined for two reasons. First,
historical records from the late eighteenth century are limited. Second, and
most importantly, the founders were a diverse group of individuals with
differing opinions regarding many issues, including the proper role of
religion in government.276
Regardless of the historical controversy, the Supreme Court should
seriously consider its excessive reliance on the founders’ beliefs and actions
when confronted with constitutional questions regarding the relationship
between religion and government. As Justice Brennan articulated, the
founders should be viewed “as the authors of a document meant to last for
the ages” rather than “sacred figures whose every actions must be
emulated.”277 In a letter to James Madison, Thomas Jefferson discussed a
“self-evident” principle: “‘that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living;’
that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.” 278 Since our modern
society is composed of a plurality of religions not necessarily based on
Christianity, relying primarily on the founders’ predominantly Christian
religious beliefs to decide contemporary Establishment Clause cases
becomes difficult to rationalize.
2. Purposes of Prayer
Theologically, the purposes of prayer are to “glorify God” 279 or
“[n]umber one, to hallow the name of God; number two, to bring in his
kingdom; [and] number three, to do his will.” 280 The purpose of legislative
prayer, on the other hand, as articulated by the legislative bodies
themselves, is to “place [elected officials] in a solemn and deliberative

274. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787 n.5 (1983).
275. MASS. CONST. ch. VI, art. 1 (amended 1821).
276. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 263, at 1158–59 (comparing the Jeffersonian and
Madisonian opinions on church and state).
277. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 817 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
278. [Letter from] Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 6 September 1789, NAT’L
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-020375-0003 (last visited Apr. 20, 2021).
279. Batterson, supra note 260.
280. The Purpose of Prayer, supra note 260.
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frame of mind,”281 to “create a ‘more businesslike and professional
decorum,’ at the meetings,”282 or to “invite[] lawmakers to reflect upon
shared ideals and common ends before they embark on the fractious
business of governing.”283
A pessimistic critic might accuse legislative bodies of masking their true
purpose of legislative prayer behind a cloak of promoting seriousness. For
example, Justice Brennan explicitly questioned the purported purposes of
legislative prayer in his dissenting opinion in Marsh.284 A less pessimistic
critic might not accuse legislators of falsely expressing their purposes
behind legislative prayer, but instead, may question the necessity of prayer
as the vehicle to achieve such purposes. As the Sixth Circuit noted, these
goals can be achieved by beginning sessions with references to inspirational
quotes that do not implicate religion whatsoever, such as passages from
Abraham Lincoln or Martin Luther King, Jr.285
3. Tyranny of the Majority
In Federalist Paper No. 51, James Madison explained that one purpose
of the Constitution is to prevent the tyranny of the majority. 286
Whilst all authority in [the federal republic of the United States]
will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society
itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of
citizens, that the rights of individuals or of the minority, will be
in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. 287
Similarly, in Federalist Paper No. 78, Alexander Hamilton articulated that
the court system guards against “serious oppressions of the minor party in
the community” because judges are appointed rather than elected. 288
Therefore, the Supreme Court has a duty to ensure that the minority voices
are heard, especially by the legislative bodies that are elected by the
majority.

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 570 (2014).
Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1999).
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 583.
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 797–98 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Coles, 171 F.3d at 384.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 487–88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gideon ed., 1818).
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Today, most U.S. citizens identify with Christianity. 289 A minority of the
citizens either identity with non-Christian religions or do not identify with
any religion.290 One study found that sixty-two percent of surveyed
agnostics and atheists were uncomfortable when asked to pray in public,
while only fifteen percent of surveyed Christians expected others to feel
uncomfortable in such situations.291 A recent law review article recognized
that this study “means non-religious legislators and members of the public
may feel out of place during the [legislative] prayers.”292
Moreover, “[i]n a democratically elected legislature, the religious beliefs
of the chaplain tend to reflect the faith of the majority of the lawmakers’
constituents,”293 which, today, is Christianity. 294 When the content of
legislative prayer is primarily Christian, “[n]on-Christian citizens attending
a town meeting with the hopes of addressing meaningful local issues may
face the choice of participating in a prayer practice they do not believe in or
offending the very government leader that they will soon be attempting to
persuade.”295 In other words, the content of prayer matters because it “can
cause citizens to feel excluded from their communities and the local
political process.”296 Additionally, legislative prayer, by its very nature,
entails government “promot[ion] [of] the idea of religion over the idea of
nonreligion.”297 Therefore, Justice Brennan’s assertion that legislative
prayer could potentially alienate citizens from their government identifies a
genuine problem with allowing such practices.298
Democracy is better served when citizens participate in democracy.
“Citizens attend local government meetings to ‘participate in democracy’
and to petition the town’s elected representatives for rights and benefits.” 299
289. Frank Newport, Percentage of Christians in U.S. Drifting Down, but Still High,
GALLUP NEWS (Dec. 24, 2015), https://news.gallup.com/poll/187955/percentage-christiansdrifting-down-high.aspx.
290. Id.
291. Leah Libresco, When Does Praying in Public Make Others Uncomfortable?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 16, 2016, 11:03 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/whendoes-praying-in-public-make-others-uncomfortable/.
292. Amanda Voeller, A Leap of Faith: Questioning the Constitutionality of Texas’s
Legislative Prayer Practice, 51 TEX. TECH L. REV. 305, 308 (2019).
293. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 822–23 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
294. See Newport, supra note 289.
295. West, supra note 6, at 728.
296. Id. at 730.
297. Voeller, supra note 292, at 323.
298. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 805–06 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
299. West, supra note 6, at 728.
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When citizens feel alienated from their governments, however, their
participation in government may decrease. 300 Democracy suffers when
citizens do not participate because citizen participation “[e]nsure[s] that
government actually works for the public good.” 301 When a minority citizen
feels alienated from his government, he may not voice his opinion, and then
legislative bodies will make public decisions without considering all
constituents. In addition, the legislative bodies may be making decisions
without even realizing such decisions are not fully informed because
minority citizens are deterred from even participating in democracy.
Citizens whose religious preferences are expressed in legislative prayers
also may object to the practice. As discussed above, the purposes of
legislative prayer significantly diverge from those of traditional theological
prayer.302 Justice Brennan was troubled by legislative prayer’s potential to
generate the “trivialization and degradation of religion.”303 In other words,
“[t]he dread of reducing prayer to the merely ceremonial and
instrumental—to idolatry—unquestionably deters some faithful and
conscientious believers.”304
By upholding legislative prayer as constitutional, the Supreme Court
facilitates the tyranny of the majority. Instead of acting as guardian of
citizens’ individual rights and protector of the minority, the Court is
ignoring citizens in their plea to prevent opening prayer in legislative
sessions. Moreover, as Justice Brennan was concerned, the Court’s
interpretation of legislative prayer as constitutional has created a “political
battle[]” regarding religion’s role in governmental bodies. 305 This feud, in
itself, hinders productive legislative sessions because citizens, as well as
legislators themselves, waste time, money, and resources arguing about
opening prayers instead of considering the meaningful issues that fill a
legislative body’s agenda.
B. Alternatives to Legislative Prayer
Justices and scholars have proposed various alternatives to legislative
prayer. For example, proposals include beginning sessions with
300. See id. at 711–12.
301. See Citizen Participation, NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST., https://www.ndi.org/what-wedo/citizen-participation (last visited Dec. 10, 2019).
302. See supra Part IV.
303. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 804.
304. Robert J. Delahunty, “Varied Carols”: Legislative Prayer in a Pluralist Polity, 40
CREIGHTON L. REV. 517, 551 (2007).
305. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 805–06.
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nonsectarian prayer or with readings of inspirational passages. 306 These
alternatives, however, do not adequately redress the concern of alienating
citizens, thereby decreasing democratic engagement. Additionally, these
alternatives may raise concerns of constitutionality. Instead, governmental
bodies, including but not limited to public school boards, should begin
sessions with a moment of silence because it adequately and inclusively
accomplishes the goals of opening prayer. Furthermore, a moment of
silence is unquestionably constitutional.
1. Nonsectarian Prayer
Rather than abolish legislative prayer altogether, Justice Kagan suggests
requiring such prayer to be nonsectarian. 307 In his concurring opinion in
Town of Greece, Justice Samuel A. Alito challenged Justice Kagan’s
suggestion of requiring legislative prayer to be nonsectarian as “daunting, if
not impossible,” given our religiously pluralist society. 308
A serious problem to this proposed solution is the fact that “prayer is
fundamentally and necessarily religious.” 309 As one law professor stated,
“the purported distinction between ‘sectarian’ and ‘non-sectarian’ prayer is
illusory.”310 Generally, prayer entails calling upon a divine being to express
one’s gratitude and to request its assistance. “Searching for a ‘nonsectarian’ essence of prayer is not like stripping the husks from an ear of
corn to find the kernels inside; it is like peeling off the layers of an onion
until nothing is left but empty space.”311 Another obstacle to this proposed
solution is the religious citizen’s objection to the trivialization of his
religion312 that could occur in attempts to reduce legislative prayer to be
devoid of religious sentiments.

306. See, e.g., Voeller, supra note 292, at 327.
307. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 632 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 595 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Not only is there no historical support for the
proposition that only generic prayer is allowed, but as our country has become more diverse,
composing a prayer that is acceptable to all members of the community who hold religious
beliefs has become harder and harder.”).
309. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 810.
310. Delahunty, supra note 304, at 522.
311. Id. at 539.
312. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 804.
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2. Inspirational Passages
Many judges and scholars suggest beginning legislative sessions with
inspirational words as an alternative to legislative prayer. 313 Allowing
“inspirational” words while prohibiting religious words, however, might
infringe on citizens’ and legislators’ free speech rights. 314 Thus, this
alternative must allow legislative bodies to begin by delivering religious
statements not amounting to a “prayer.”315
Although reciting “something like a Bible verse or words from the Pope
would be more appropriate than a prayer,”316 this surrogate to legislative
prayer still has the potential to alienate citizens. For example, if a legislative
body predominantly began sessions with a biblical verse, the concern that
non-Christian citizens would feel alienated still exists. Therefore, this
alternative of removing specifically prayer while still allowing legislators to
verbalize statements, including those of religious connotations, does not
address the primary problem of legislative prayer. Such statements with
religious overtones in governmental affairs can alienate minority citizens,
thereby inhibiting a successful democracy.
3. Moment of Silence
Beginning sessions with a moment of silence, thereby abolishing
opening prayer altogether, is a plausible alternative. 317 In Wallace v. Jaffree,
the Supreme Court considered three statutes relating to a moment of silence
at the beginning of public school days. 318 The first statute, which was not
found to be unconstitutional, “authorized a 1-minute period of silence in all
public schools ‘for meditation.’”319 The Court struck down the second and
third statutes as unconstitutional,320 holding that they expanded on the
moment of silence when explicitly authorizing the time “for meditation or

313. See, e.g., Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 384 (6th Cir.
1999); see also Voeller, supra note 292, at 327, 329.
314. Voeller, supra note 292, at 329.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 323 (“Ensuring that legislative prayer practices are constitutional is such a
subjective analysis that it would be fairer to abolish the practice, not because of any
animosity toward religion, but because abiding by the United States Constitution—the
foundation of our country—should be the United States legal system’s first and foremost
goal.”).
318. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40–41 (1985).
319. Id. at 40.
320. Id. at 48, 61.
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voluntary prayer”321 and allowing “teachers to lead ‘willing students’ in a
prescribed prayer to ‘Almighty God . . . the Creator and Supreme Judge of
the world.’”322 Specifically, the Court found that these two statutes were
enacted “for the sole purpose of expressing the State’s endorsement of
prayer activities”323 because the statute authorizing one minute of silence
already “protect[ed] every student’s right to engage in voluntary prayer
during an appropriate moment of silence during the schoolday.” 324
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell asserted that “some moment-ofsilence statutes may be constitutional, a suggestion set forth in the Court’s
opinion as well.”325 In a separate concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor,
distinguishing “[a] state-sponsored moment of silence . . . from statesponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading,”326 explained that “a moment of
silence is not inherently religious” and a participant “need not compromise
his or her beliefs.”327 According to Justice O’Connor, a moment-of-silence
statute is constitutional as long as it “is clearly drafted and implemented so
as to permit prayer, meditation, and reflection within the prescribed period,
without endorsing one alternative other the others.”328
Legislatures, deliberative bodies, and public school boards should
implement a moment of silence rather than opening prayer because such a
practice “would create the same solemnity that legislative prayer purports to
create and may achieve this goal more inclusively than prayer does.” 329 This
practice would pass constitutional muster under the traditional Lemon
analysis used in Establishment Clause claims. 330 First, a moment of silence
has an exclusively secular purpose of promoting seriousness to the
beginning of legislative sessions. Second, a moment of silence neither
advances nor inhibits religion because individuals may use the time as they
choose, whether to “reflect on their goals for the day, meditate, or use those
moments of peace however they feel would best benefit them.” 331 Third, a
moment of silence would not foster any governmental entanglement with
religion because religion is simply not implicated.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 72 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 76.
Voeller, supra note 292, at 327.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 327.
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While it would be subject to strict scrutiny because no individual is given
the right to speak during the moment of silence, the practice remains
constitutional. The government has a compelling interest in creating an
inclusive atmosphere for legislative sessions by mandating a moment of
silence, rather than allowing the practice of opening prayers, to ensure
citizens’ participation in government.332 Additionally, this practice would
respect the historical tradition of legislative prayer by preserving its general
purposes while modernizing the tradition to be more inclusive and
respectful of our country’s diverse citizens.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has held opening prayer at deliberative bodies as
constitutional under the Establishment Clause. Whether the Court would
allow opening prayer at public school boards is speculative, although
possible, because of the Court’s heightened concern regarding religion at
public schools. Regardless, legislatures, deliberative bodies, and public
school boards should not continue such practices due to the risk of
alienating citizens, which decreases democratic engagement. Additionally,
opening prayer at public school board meetings may be indirectly coercive
to students, who have a heightened risk of succumbing to peer pressure to
conform. The Establishment Clause protects citizens’ right to freedom of
religion, and opening prayer at deliberative bodies is at direct odds with this
fundamental right.
Kaitlyn M. Huelskamp

332. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 805–06 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Establishment Clause seeks . . . that no American should at any point feel alienated
from his government because that government has declared or acted upon some ‘official’ or
‘authorized’ point of view on a matter of religion.”).
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